Interview with Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka, Secretary of State in the Ministry of National Defense.

At the end of August, Italy announced that it had decided to use only 8.9 billion euros in loans under the SAFE instrument, even though the European Commission had allocated 14.9 billion euros to the country. It is important news because it means that in early 2027 there may be substantial unused defense funds from this source available for distribution. Will Poland apply for additional funds from SAFE?

I wouldn’t count my chickens before they hatch. As to the funds we could apply for, we won’t know the exact amount until November, or perhaps even December. Why? In October, every country participating in the SAFE mechanism must submit a report to the European Commission on the status of spending the allocated funds. You mentioned a smaller amount of loans for Italy, but we still don’t know how much funding will ultimately go to Hungary, which was initially allocated over 16 billion euros. It’s also uncertain what will happen with the 3 billion euros for Bulgaria, as the new government is having trouble contracting them.

In addition, the so-called minor amendment to SAFE is currently underway, and it will last until October. We’re adjusting order quantities – wherever we’ve managed to save money, we’re buying more equipment. This is the situation, for example, with tanker aircraft – we originally planned to buy two, but we’ll ultimately sign a contract for four. Later, we’ll carry out the so-called major amendment to SAFE. It involves defining new tasks, since we still have funds to spend. Let me remind you that as a result of the President’s decision to veto the SAFE bill, there are 3 billion euros available for allocation – funds that will not be used by the Police or the Border Guard, for example. First, we must allocate this money, and then we will consider whether to seek new funding.

It is worth noting, however, that we were the only country in the European Union that managed to complete contracting independent procurement orders by the end of May. As a result, we will invest 120 billion zlotys in our own defense industry.

What about international joint procurement contracts, for which we have approximately 60 billion zlotys?

There is no deadline for concluding joint equipment contracts with our partners. We are more constrained by the timeframe for their implementation, as the ordered defense products must be delivered by mid-2030. Less complex items, such as bulletproof vests or helmets, can be ordered as late as 2029. However, when it comes to equipment that requires components with long production lead times – such as the aforementioned tanker aircraft – contracts must already be signed this year.

What products can foreign customers order from the Polish defense industry under the SAFE program?

The first success is a contract for the Piorun air defense system, which was signed by Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Norway. We are set to conclude agreements with Canada for our drones, with Greece for satellite systems, with Sweden for a rescue vessel, and with Norway for the San system. Slovakia will likely place an order for San as well. These joint agreements are expected in the coming weeks and months.

When I started the work on SAFE, I often heard that as part of these joint procurement efforts we would probably end up buying something from other countries, because no one wants to buy from us. After six months of intensive work and trade missions in Europe and Canada, it’s clear that other countries are actually interested in our equipment. I believe that SAFE should not only provide our military with better weapons, but also bring investments into the economy that will benefit each and every one of us.

Let’s return to the equipment purchased for the Polish Armed Forces. Can heavy A400M aircraft and combat training helicopters be ordered under the SAFE program?

The purchase of four A330 MRTTs is certain, but it wasn’t an easy process. We had to find a partner, and we were really pressed for time. We succeeded, and we will purchase the aircraft jointly with Spain. On top of that, Airbus representatives initially claimed that they would only be able to deliver one aircraft to us by 2030. That’s why we began negotiations with the Spanish government to make their production slots [their place in the delivery queue] available to us, and with Airbus to speed up the production of the tanker aircraft. Today, we already have assurances that as many as four aircraft will be delivered by the required deadline.

The procurement of transport aircraft or combat training helicopters is a challenge for the future major amendment that I mentioned earlier. I’m not ruling out the possibility that these programs will materialize, but we need a partner from the European Union who will make the same purchase from the same manufacturer. And, of course, we must be sure that the ordered machines will be delivered by 2030.

The issue of schedules is also important in the case of contracts concluded with domestic manufacturers, who in the past have occasionally requested extensions of the delivery deadlines for contracted armament.

The Armament Agency has drafted contracts that clearly spell out the terms of execution and specify penalties for non-compliance. We have a system that continuously monitors the progress of these orders. Furthermore, the first deliveries from manufacturers are expected as early as September 2026. This mainly applies to bulletproof vests and helmets. Some of the drones will also be delivered later this year.

The funds from SAFE are a tremendous opportunity for the Polish defense industry. There has never been a stronger impetus for the development of the Polish defense industry. We already have the first specific data on rising employment. Mesko, for example, has hired over 200 new workers since May, and plans to hire more next year. Across the entire Polish Armaments Group, this increase in employment already totals over 1,000 people. Revenue growth has also been reported at most companies within PGZ, as well as at WB Electronics and APS [Advanced Protection Systems], companies with which we have contracted for equipment financed from SAFE.

However, there has been criticism that the SAFE instrument will completely push out suppliers from outside Europe, particularly the United States.

The value of our defense contracts with the United States, which total more than the value of the entire SAFE instrument, is not decreasing. This month, we will sign an agreement with Thomas DiNanno, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, on new funding for Poland under the FMF [Foreign Military Financing] program for the purchase of US equipment. Absolutely nothing has changed in our relationship.

During a recent visit to Washington, I observed that the USA views SAFE, and Poland’s extensive involvement in it, in two ways. First, according to the Americans, it fulfills President Donald Trump’s call for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own security. Second, the US views our purchases under the EU instrument as Polish government’s strong determination to invest as much as possible in the domestic defense industry, so that it can be as advanced as possible, and an attractive partner for other countries in the co-production of armament.

Does this mean that American companies will be more willing to engage in industrial cooperation with our defense industry?

I tell not just American, but all foreign companies which want to sell something in Poland that the days when we were merely a customer are over. We’re starting to apply the principle that we select equipment suppliers by evaluating not only the quality and price of the product, but also the possibility of co-production in Poland. What matters is that the contractor has Polish subcontractors, establishes a service center here, or invests in the training of Polish employees. Our partners are beginning to understand that we are transitioning from being a customer to being a partner. We will not stray from the chosen path, and this message has also been clearly received in the United States.

What are we planning to order from the United States using the new FMF funds? CH-47 Chinook transport helicopters?

It’s too early for me today to discuss specific solutions. I will emphasize, however, that any decisions regarding equipment for our army will be based on the needs identified by military commanders. As for our relations with the Americans, we are currently putting tremendous effort into negotiations aimed at establishing in Poland a service center for PAC-3 missiles used in the Patriot system.

What is the delivery schedule for the PAC-3 MSE missiles that Poland has already contracted for? Although the Americans have increased production, it fails to satisfy all needs.

The fact that the US is unable to produce a sufficient number of these missiles is a global problem. We therefore face a massive negotiating and diplomatic effort to secure Poland’s highest possible position in the queue for Patriot ammunition. In this regard, our close relations with the United States are extremely helpful.

On the one hand, we need to work hard to minimize delivery delays, but on the other, this is a great bargaining chip for obtaining approval to produce the missiles. The Americans are beginning to understand that without missile production in Europe, it’s impossible to quickly fill the existing gaps. However, we must be aware that the defense industry is not a sector whose operations can be accelerated overnight.

Given the long lead times, shouldn’t we order additional F-35s as soon as possible?

For now, we’re focusing on introducing the two purchased squadrons into service as quickly as possible. There are already eight F-35As in Poland, and by the end of this year, the Polish Air Force will have 14 aircraft of this type at its disposal.

What are the main challenges associated with the technical modernization of the Polish Armed Forces, whose needs for new equipment are still significant?

The greatest challenge today is not the purchase of new equipment itself, but translating very large investments into coherent, realistic, and sustainable combat capabilities. The needs of the armed forces remain enormous, and the modernization must be carried out quickly, rationally, and with due consideration given to the lessons learned from contemporary armed conflicts. Setting the right priorities is a key issue. It is the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and the commanders of individual branches who determine operational needs, which should then be translated into specific modernization programs.

Maintaining the right pace of action is another challenge. Poland must simultaneously make up for years of backwardness, develop new capabilities, and respond to rapidly changing technologies. We cannot wait a dozen or so years for ideal solutions if we need specific capabilities here and now. However, purchases made in a hurry must be planned properly to ensure training, logistics, servicing, spare parts, ammunition, and the necessary infrastructure.

The third challenge is to move away from perceiving modernization as simply replacing old equipment with new. A modern army must be a system of interconnected capabilities –reconnaissance, command and control, communications, drones, artillery, air defense, electronic warfare, logistics, and precision striking. The purchase of a modern platform alone is not enough if it is not integrated into such a system.

The fourth challenge is rebuilding and developing domestic production capabilities. The war behind our eastern border has shown how crucial it is to have stockpiles of equipment and the ability to quickly replace losses. The final challenge is human resources. Modern equipment requires trained soldiers, technicians, engineers, and command staff. Technical modernization must proceed in parallel with increasing the size of the army, training, and infrastructure development. That is precisely why the modernization of the Polish Armed Forces should be treated not as a series of individual contracts, but as a long-term process of building the nation’s military and industrial capabilities.